of reservations and limitations upon General Nivelle's authority. All these questions ought to have been raised weeks ago and settled. It is right to say that some of the suspicions and apprehensions arrayed in these protests were provoked by a brusque and rather impertinent message sent to the British General from a member of the French Staff, couched in the tones of a peremptory order from a chief to a subordinate.

Tactless messages of French General Staff

This roused in Sir Douglas Haig's already suspicious breast all manner of forebodings as to the ulterior motives of the French Government and its Generals.

He said amongst other things that he "had heard rumours before the Calais Conference of a desire in some quarters in France to gain practically complete control over the British Army and even to break up its unity and sandwich British units and formations between French troops under French control." As a matter of fact this was done in 1918 without presenting any practical difficulties or raising any questions of dignity and personal authority. French divisions were sandwiched in the north between English divisions, all being under the command of Sir Douglas Haig, and British divisions were sandwiched in the Soissons area between French divisions, under the command of General Petain.

However, I did not apprehend any difficulty in overcoming the objections raised by Sir Douglas

Haig. But Sir William Robertson went
Robertson's very much further and
objected to the
principle whole agreement on the
ground of prin-
ciple and precedent. Before the
Calais
Conference he made it clear that he
deprecated the
plan. At the Calais Conference which
he attended
he never uttered one word of protest.
He confined